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Illicit financial flows (IFFs) are a global issue that is estimated to take from the world $2 
trillion in revenue. The African continent is particularly susceptible, as over $836 billion of 
IFFs comes from sub-Saharan Africa. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is 
particularly vulnerable due to its low regulation and high corruption, as well as the DRC’s 
cash economy that mostly deals in US dollars. DRC has also had several recent high-profile 
cases of individuals who have been able to circumvent United States (U.S.) sanctions in the 
DRC, such as North Korean Pak Hwa Song and Hwang Kil Su, and Dan Gertler. The proposal 
outlined is for the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of the Treasury to 
work with the DRC to help with their IFFs problem in four key steps. The four steps are: 
implement further sanctions, strengthen previously enacted sanctions in the DRC, increase 
DRC anti-corruption agreements on foreign aid and International Monetary Fund loans, and 
implement an Office of Trade Assistance program to increase the DRC’s Anti-Money 
Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Framework. Now is a unique 
time in which the U.S.-DRC partnership is strong, and President Félix Tshisekedi has 
consolidated power away from his predecessor Laurent Kabila so increased regulation and 
reform in the DRC is possible. Ultimately, the recommendation is to enact this policy as it 
falls in line with U.S. policy goals and can be implemented through existing U.S. programs. 
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE, ANTONY J. BLINKEN AND SECRETARY OF 
TREASURY, JANET YELLEN 
 
DATE: APRIL 20, 2021 
FROM: SUZANNE TIMMERMAN 
SUBJECT: THE UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO TO 
COMBAT ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS (IFFS) 
 
I. Action-Forcing Event 
 
A recent 2020 report made by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) stated that every year 86.6 billion USD leaves Africa due to illicitly acquired capital, 
also called illicit financial flows.1  
 
II. Statement of the Problem 
 
Illicit financial flows (IFFs) are a global problem. Worldwide losses from IFFs are estimated by the 
UN Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) at over $2 trillion globally.2 Every country should be 
concerned with IFFs, because IFFs are used to harm others and do not respect a county’s border. 
Africa is affected more than other continents by illicit capital fleeing the continent. Compared to 
countries elsewhere, African countries are more susceptible to the impacts of IFFs due to low-
                                                          
1 Chloé Maurel, “Illicit financial flows hinder development in Africa – the UN must rise to the challenge of ending this,” Equal Times, 
January 21, 2021, https://www.equaltimes.org/illicit-financial-flows-hinder#.YBiY-ehKg2w.  
2 Steven M. D’Antuono, “Combating Money Laundering and Other Forms of Illicit Finance: Regulator and Law Enforcement 





income countries’ vulnerabilities. Capital flight between 2000-2015 was estimated at over $836 
billion from sub-Saharan Africa.3 While many parts of sub-Saharan Africa contribute to the 
overall problem, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), due to its unique combination of 
factors, is a huge risk for IFFs. DRC has many overarching problems such as the lack of 
government transparency and corruption, which add to IFFs.  
 
IFFs are defined as money which is “illegally earned, transferred, or used that crosses borders.”4 
This definition means that IFFs usually include illicit capital flight, tax evasion, illegal markets and 
mispricing shipments, corruption and theft.5 IFFs can be used by any number of individuals, 
companies, and/or state actors. IFFs are also used to fund militia groups and terrorist activities.6 
Included in the IFFs are not only the practice of using the illegal acts that produce the funds, but 
also the money laundering that makes the money appear legitimate to be able to be used for 
other activities. For example, the money generated by IFFs activity in DRC is being used to fund 
ISIS activities in the east, as well as the local militia groups involved in violence in Eastern Congo 
who have been active in the region for over 20 years.7 Recently, Brookings Institute has named 
the DRC as one of the top four producers of illicit flows from sub-Saharan Africa, along with 
South Africa, Ethiopia, and Nigeria. Brookings estimates that these four countries send out over 
50 percent of the total amount of IFFs from sub-Saharan Africa.8  
 
                                                          
3 UNCTAD, “Tackling Illicit Financial Flows for Sustainable Development in Africa,” Economic Development in Africa Report 2020, 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, 2020, https://unctad.org/fr/system/files/official-
document/aldcafrica2020_en.pdf. 
4 World Bank, “Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs),” World Bank, July 7, 2017, 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/brief/illicit-financial-flows-iffs.  
5 UNCTAD, “Africa could gain $89 billion annually by curbing illicit financial flows,” September 28, 2020 
https://unctad.org/news/africa-could-gain-89-billion-annually-curbing-illicit-financial-flows.  
6 Maurel, “Illicit financial flows.” 
7 CFR InfoGuide Presentation, “The Eastern Congo,” Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/eastern-congo/#!/?cid=soc-
at-interactive-the_eastern_congo_infoguide-121015.  






Figure 1: John Cusack, FCN Sub Saharan Africa Scoring Model, Financial Crime News, 2020 
The Financial Crime News (FCN) Sub Saharan Africa Financial Crime Index – 2020 states that DRC 
is one of the highest risks of IFFs. DRC is specifically ranked as 14/100 on the FCN scale which is 
considered extra-high risk.9 A statement from the U.S. Department of State (State) says that 
while DRC is not considered a regional financial center, it has very little control of the borders 
with nine other countries and has corruption through all sectors of society.10 In the past DRC has 
remained under the radar, as it is not identified as one of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
black or grey listed countries. IFFs organizations have had hard time collecting the total amount 
of IFFs in the DRC, as DRC has not participated in many of the studies done by international 
watch organizations. Recent groups, however, have started bringing to light the true depth of 
the issue such as Brookings, Sentry, and FCN. Not only is DRC not actively working with overall 
                                                          
9 John Cusack, “Sub Saharan Africa Financial Crime Country Index 2020,” Financial Crime News, 2020, 
https://thefinancialcrimenews.com/sub-saharan-africa-financial-crime-index-2020/. 
10 KnowYourCountry, “Congo DR,” KnowYourCountry, 2019, https://www.knowyourcountry.com/congodr1111. 
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international groups for reporting due to the difficult nature of collecting data in the country, 
but DRC is also not implementing the key governmental safeguards that have helped other 
countries fight illicit activities. The combination of the previously mentioned factors means DRC 
is high risk, and the country is not doing everything they can to combat it when it occurs.11 
 
The FATF defines their Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) 
framework for risk score as “bribery and corruption, financial transparency and standards, 
public transparency and accountability, legal and political risks.”12 DRC demonstrates all of these 
factors, due to its unique makeup of low government regulation, inadequate tax system, low 
transparency, and high corruption, thereby creating a system that can be taken advantage of by 
different international actors.13  On the Transparency International Corruption Index, DRC scores 
18/100 and on the World Governance Indicator – Control of Corruption indicator they score 
3/100.14 DRC due to the weakness of the Congolese franc, does most of its transactions in U.S. 
dollars and have a mostly informal cash economy. DRC also has an inadequate judicial system 
and weak law enforcement, which leads to illicit activities avoiding punishment. The 
combination of these factors has resulted in international bad actors being able to take 
advantage of the situation in the country and do international harm.  
 
High profile cases have occurred in DRC that highlight the seriousness of the problem. Some 
specific cases that have been highlighted are instances of large sums of money that could be 
                                                          
11 FATF, “Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring – 21 February 2020,” FATF, February 21, 2020, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/high-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/documents/increased-monitoring-february-2020.html.  
12 Sanction Scanner, “Major Money Laundering Countries,” Sanction Scanner, 2020, https://sanctionscanner.com/blog/major-
money-laundering-countries-251 - :~:text=The top 10 countries with,), Yemen (7.12).  
13 IMF Country Focus, “Five Takeaways from Democratic Republic of the Congo's IMF Program,” International Monetary Funds, 
December 23, 2019, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/12/20/na122019five-takeaways-from-the-democratic-republic-of-
the-congos-imf-program.  
14 KnowYourCountry, “Congo DR.”  
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used against the U.S. in the future. North Korean citizens Pak Hwa Song and Hwang Kil Su were 
contracted by local government officials to use public funds on construction projects in 2018 
and 2019. The North Koreans used this opportunity to create a bank account in Congo for 
money laundering U.S. dollars, which is against U.S. sanctions and shows the ease of access that 
malicious groups employ to get around the sanctions through DRC.15 Another example is when 
in 2017 the U.S. sanctioned Dan Gertler, an Israeli businessman who owns mines in DRC. Gertler 
has been connected to IFFs, such as money laundering, that lost DRC more than $1.36 billion 
due to undervaluing assets. Again, even after the U.S. sanctions, he was allowed by Congolese 
banks to deal in U.S. dollars.16 Money laundering and profit from illicit activities is also 
connected to former Congolese President Kabila and other high ranking government officials. 
The largest dealings with these activities have circulated as much as $140 million in 
misappropriated funds and included a Swiss-Angolan banker, a Chinese corporation, and an 
international lawyer.17 
 
The DRC is also high risk due to its abundance of natural resources and energy source potential. 
In fact, it is the country’s huge monetary source that makes it a prime candidate for illegal 
exploitation of natural resources. DRC is the world’s second highest provider of diamonds and 
the highest exporter of cobalt ore.18 The UN report says that many African countries do not have 
“the means to verify the quantities of natural resources produced, relying instead on exporter 
declarations.”19 The conflict gold mining in Eastern DRC has been particularly susceptible to 
                                                          
15 The Sentry, “Artful Dodgers New Findings on North Korean Sanctions-Busting in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” The Sentry, 
January 2021, https://cdn.thesentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ArtfulDodgers-TheSentry-January2021.pdf.  
16 Global Witness, “Undermining Sanctions,” Global Witness, January 2020, 
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/corruption-and-money-laundering/undermining-sanctions/.   
17 The Sentry, “Covert Capital: The Kabila Family’s Secret Investment Bank,” The Sentry, May 2019, 
https://thesentry.org/reports/covert-capital/.  
18 Maurel, “Illicit financial flows.” 
19 UNCTAD, “Tackling Illicit Financial Flows.” 
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natural resource fraud, as an estimated $3 billion in gold was lost this year from gold mining. 
Gold mining is frequently used, according to the Sentry, as “a money laundering vehicle by 
armed groups, criminal networks, and corrupt actors, who can then mask its origins by melting it 
together with other gold.”20 The Gertler case was also derived from the sale of natural 
resources.  
 
Additionally, the current Covid-19 crisis has also led to economic disruption, consolidations of 
finances, and large bailouts that have exacerbated the issue of IFFs around the world. Criminals 
have quickly tried to exploit the crisis to commit fraud and other types of illegal financing 
activity.21 Counter-illicit financial flows measures, and reports have been delayed due to the 
crisis.22 There has been an increased risk of misappropriation of funds for local economic 
stimulus and foreign financial aid. Some organizations, like the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), have used Covid-19 to attach anti-illicit financial activity measures to the agreement of 
additional Covid-19 aid. DRC was one of the countries that agreed to the additional measures, 
but these measures are not yet implemented on all IMF loans from all sources.23 The specific 
concern for DRC is new financial assistance could be misused by corrupt government officials, as 
well as individuals obtaining government contracts and will not be used for the health sector, 
but instead used for illicit means.24 
 
                                                          
20 Sasha Lezhnev and Megha Swamy, “Understanding Money Laundering Risks in the Conflict Gold Trade From East and Central 
Africa to Dubai and Onward,” The Sentry, November 2020, https://thesentry.org/reports/conflict-gold-trade/.  
21 FATF, “Money Laundering,” FATF, 2020, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/covid-19-ml-tf.html.  
22 FATF, “Financial Action Task Force - Annual Report 2019-2020”, FATF/OECD, 2020, https://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/annual-report-2019-2020.html. 
23 IMF on Corruption and Covid-19, “How the IMF is Promoting Transparent and Accountable Use of COVID-19 Financial Assistance,” 
IMF, 2021, https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2020/04/30/how-imf-covid19-financial-help-is-used.  
24 FATF, “Money Laundering.” 
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The impact of these activities is widespread. IFFs are especially detrimental to the desperately 
needed economic development in the DRC. The domestic productive capacity of countries, 
including DRC, is being decreased due to IFFs. Capital flight leads to an inability for countries to 
fund their countries’ public needs, such as services and infrastructure. By curbing the IFFs issue, 
countries will be able to fund health, education, environmental, and other critical needs that 
would especially help marginal persons.25 For DRC, while some years of data are missing, the 
total amount of capital flight estimated is over 5 percent of its GDP that could instead be used to 
fund critical needs for the citizens.26 The Gertler case lost DRC double the amount that DRC 
spent on health and education in the 2017 fiscal year.27 From 1980 to 2018 sub-Saharan Africa 
received almost $2 trillion in foreign aid, but lost $1 trillion in IFFs.28 Due to the impact which 
IFFs have on these development gains, the World Bank has stated that IFFs are rapidly becoming 
a key development challenge.  
 
Many people involved in IFFs are multinational actors and the U.S. has a great stake in fixing the 
IFFs issue. The U.S. can work in the specific international region (the DRC) to help reduce the 
global problem. The UNCTAD report suggests that developed and developing countries need to 
share the responsibility of this issue. In fact, the UNCTAD report goes as far as to say, “many 
African governments do not benefit from a significant portion of their international trade 
transactions and experience significant losses in capital and foreign exchange.”29 The UN 16th 
Sustainable Development Goal asks member states to strive to reduce IFFs by 2030.30 DRC is a 
                                                          
25 Maurel, “Illicit financial flows.” 
26 UNCTAD, “Tackling Illicit Financial Flows.” 
27 TV5Monde Afrique, “RD Congo : révélations sur un réseau de blanchiment d'argent,” January 13, 2021, 
https://afrique.tv5monde.com/information/rd-congo-revelations-sur-un-reseau-de-blanchiment-dargent.  
28 Payce Madden, “New Trends.”  
29 UNCTAD, “Tackling Illicit Financial Flows.” 




vulnerable country for IFFs as previously outlined, and it would be a benefit to the DRC, as well 
as the world, to combat this matter. As the UN report says, the IFFs situation needs to be 
mitigated at the global level. The U.S. can move forward with the DRC on IFFs, because while 




IFFs are a matter in which the U.S. and DRC can cooperate. On August 17, 2020, the U.S. has 
identified some of the problems the DRC has and how the U.S. can help. A bipartisan group of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee sent a letter to the previous Secretary of State Mike 
Pompeo and the previous Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin to help DRC undertake 
anti-IFFs measures, as well as other reform.31 Many of these measures were contingent on 
President Félix Tshisekedi being further open to reform, which in the last year it seems 
Tshisekedi has been making strides. The measures proposed in the letter have not yet been 
enacted upon. The U.S. should further be concerned with the problem of those under U.S. 
sanctions being able to circumvent them by going to the DRC. Several individuals and 
companies, like the North Koreans, Gertler, and more have been able to exploit these 
weaknesses.32 In the case of Gertler, however, President Trump quietly eased sanctions on him 
right before leaving office, though Gertler is still heavily involved in illegal financing and 
corruption in mining and oil.33 Gertler hired the same lawyer who defended Trump in his 2020 
                                                          
31 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Risch, Menendez Lead Colleagues In Encouraging Administration To Press 
For Structural Reform In DRC,” United States, Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, August 17, 2020, 
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/risch-menendez-lead-colleagues-in-encouraging-administration-to-press-for-
structural-reform-in-drc.  





Senate impeachment trial to get the waiver, which giving that waiver was generally decried as 
the incorrect move from Congress and international observers.34 U.S. sanctions are very 
impactful in a dollarized economy country. Many of the offenders travel to western countries 
and have bank accounts overseas, so sanctions take away their ability to do these international 
transaction.35 
 
Illicit Financial Flows is a term created in the 1990s to wholly encompass the different activities 
from the illegal acts, the funds from those acts, and funds for illegal purposes. The World Bank 
explicitly singles out developing countries as particularly susceptible. There are several 
international organizations that are working on the IFFs problem, such as the FATF and the 
UNODC.36 The FATF issues recommendations and standards to help authorities combat global 
money laundering and terrorist financing.37 DRC, while not directly under FATF, is a part of their 
associate member group called The Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa (Groupe 
d’Action contre le blanchiment d’Argent en Afrique Centrale (GABAC)).38 The GABAC website 
only has reports from the Republic of Congo, Central African Republic (CAR), Cameron, and 
Gabon from 2013-2015. New international reports are needed and especially one from DRC.39  
The most common internationally accepted controls for IFFs are the standard AML/CFT 
framework characterized by the IMF and the previously mentioned organizations.40 Example 
                                                          
34 Nick Wadhams, Saleha Mohsin, and Michael Kavanagh, “U.S. Likely to Undo Israeli Billionaire’s Sanctions Reprieve,” February 3, 
2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-03/house-democrats-urge-yellen-to-reinstate-gertler-sanctions.  
35 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Risch, Menendez.”  
36 World Bank, “Illicit Financial Flows.” 
37 FATF, “Who we are,” FATF, 2020, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/whoweare/.  
38 FATF, “GABAC,” FATF, 2020, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/gabac.html.  
39 GABAC, “Rapports D’évaluation Mutuelle,” GABAC, 2015, http://spgabac.org/rapports-devaluation-mutuelle/.   





laws and standards are given by the IMF, and recently it has started adding these as a 
requirement for country loans.41 
 
One of the major contributing factors to the DRC’s risk of IFFs is bribery and corruption. 
Corruption is rampant throughout all public sectors going to the highest levels. IFFs tend to be 
linked to tax evasion and illegally hiding income.42 The tax administration is considered 
inefficient and does not have the resources to punish companies that take advantage the 
weaknesses. A case highlighting this inadequacy was given on the Risk & Compliance Portal. The 
Risk & Compliance Portal outlined someone who tried to decry a multinational company running 
a tax evasion scheme led to retaliation against the whistleblower, not the company.43 The 
second major issue for the DRC is public transparency and accountability. The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has a Convention of Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters which is used to mitigate the tax fraud and evasion in a country; 
however, the DRC has not signed on to the above stated convention or provided data, unlike 
many of its neighboring countries who have signed.44 The DRC ranks 135 out of 157 on the 
Human Capital Index, with an average school attendance at 9.2 years.45 The country has many 
issues which stem from low infrastructure, such as a low funded healthcare system and public 
education system that exacerbates the problems already in the city. The DRC is currently dealing 
with another Ebola outbreak as well as many other diseases.46 From the congressional letter 
                                                          
41 IMF on Corruption and Covid-19, “COVID-19 Financial Assistance.” 
42 World Bank, “Illicit Financial Flows.”  
43 GAN Integrity, “DR Congo Corruption Report,” Risk & Compliance Portal, August 2020, 
https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/.  
44 OECD, “Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters,” September 2020, OECD, 
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/convention-on-mutual-administrative-assistance-in-tax-matters.htm.  
45 World Bank, “Illicit Financial Flows.” 
46 Disease outbreak news, “Ebola virus disease – Democratic Republic of the Congo,” World Health Organization (WHO), February 10, 




“the country’s new leadership has yet to meaningfully curb high-level corruption, continuing 
state capture by former President Joseph Kabila and his acolytes, and systematic violence 
perpetuated by state security forces and their armed proxies in the east.”47 
 
The DRC, the second largest country in Africa, is about one-fourth the size of the U.S. and has 
nine border countries. The many porous borders also contribute to the capital flight. These 
borders, especially in the east with daily uncontrolled crossing, are where other countries get 
involved in the DRC conflicts and financial flow disputes. The nine countries that border DRC are: 
Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda to the east; Central African Republic and South Sudan 
to the north; Angola and Zambia to the south; and the Republic of Congo to the west. 48 All of 
these countries have had conflict issues which inevitably involve their neighboring countries. 
The violence in Eastern DRC originated when Laurent Kabila’s rebellion toppled the previous 
dictator’s regime. Even though Kabila’s rebellion was an internal DRC struggle, the rebellion was 
backed by Rwanda and Uganda.49 Additionally, troops from Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan, and 
Zimbabwe helped support the early Kabila regime from other insurrection attempts.50  
 
Eastern DRC has more than 100 active militant groups, including those from neighboring 
countries such as Rwanda and Uganda.51 The Eastern DRC is also where many of Congo’s 
minerals and large farmland resources are located, but the ongoing conflict allows bad actors to 
take advantage of the Eastern DRC region instead of the country and its citizens reaping the 
                                                          
47 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2020. 
48 One World – Nations Online, “Political Map of Democratic Republic of the Congo,” 
https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/dr_congo_map2.htm.  
49 CIA World Factbook, “Congo, Democratic Republic of the,” CIA, February 24, 2021, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-
factbook/countries/congo-democratic-republic-of-the/#terrorism. 





benefit.52 The interconnectedness of this region also means that working on IFFs in the DRC will 
help all countries in the Great Lakes region. There are reports that the Islamic State of Iraq and 
ash-Sham (ISIS) – Central Africa, also known as ISIS-DRC, have been identified as working in 
Eastern DRC with local militant groups.53 54 President Tshisekedi’s government in 2019, at the 
same time as committing to a new U.S.-DRC relationship, joined the U.S.-led Global Coalition to 
Defeat ISIS.55 Because of the multinational complicated nature of the Eastern DRC region, the 
previous U.S. administration had a position called the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes.56 The 
previous person was Peter Pham, until he was changed to be the special envoy for Africa’s Sahel 
region in March 2020. The UN appointed Huang Xia, a Chinese citizen, as a Special Envoy to the 
Great Lakes.57 A new United States Special Envoy for the Great Lakes has not yet been 
appointed.58 The UN additionally brokered a deal in the Eastern area called Peace, Security and 
Cooperation Framework that 11 countries in the region signed, but violence still persists.59 The 
violence in the Eastern DRC is why the UN peacekeeping Mission in DRC (MONUSCO) is the 
largest peacekeeping mission in the world.60 Not only is MONUSCO the largest mission, the U.S. 
is the largest financial backer of MONUSCO.61 
                                                          
52 CFR InfoGuide Presentation, “Eastern Congo.”  
53 CIA, “Terrorist Organizations,” CIA, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/references/terrorist-organizations/.  
54 Rukmini Callimachi, “ISIS, After Laying Groundwork, Gains Toehold in Congo, The New York Times,” April 20, 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/20/world/africa/isis-attack-congo.html.  
55 Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet “U.S. Relations With Democratic Republic of the Congo,” U.S. Department of State Bureau of African 
Affairs, April 15, 2020, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-democratic-republic-of-the-
congo/#:~:text=The%20Privileged%20Partnership%20for%20Peace,major%20investor%20and%20trading%20partner.&text=Leading
%20DRC%20exports%20to%20the,beans%2C%20propane%2C%20and%20tantalum. 
56 Office of the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa, “Our Mission,” U.S. Department of State, 
https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/special-envoy-for-the-great-lakes-region-of-africa/.  
57 United Nations, “Special Envoy Huang Xia Of The Great Lakes Region Visits Several Countries To Discuss Matters Of Peace, Security 
And Development,” Office of the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes, October 8, 2020, https://ungreatlakes.unmissions.org/special-
envoy-huang-xia-great-lakes-region-visits-several-countries-discuss-matters-peace-security.  
58 Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. creates new envoy position to counter rising terrorism in Sahel,” Reuters, March 6, 2020, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-sahel/u-s-creates-new-envoy-position-to-counter-rising-terrorism-in-sahel-idUSKBN20T2ZJ.  
59 Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, “About,” UN Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, https://dppa.un.org/en/mission/special-
envoy-great-lakes-region.  
60 BBC, “DR Congo peacekeeping: UN votes to scale down mission,” BBC, March 31, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
39456884.  





The DRC has historically been mismanaged and exploited for its resources. DRC, as with many 
other African colonized nations, already has a history of exploitation which makes it a ripe 
candidate for IFFs. As Maurel for the Equal Times put it, IFFs are “rooted in the exploitative 
history of colonialism”, which is evidenced in the DRC’s history. IFFs are a worldwide problem 
that the U.S. can help mitigate by reducing some of the risks in the DRC. As the CIA World 
Factbook overview puts it the “systemic corruption since independence in 1960, combined with 
countrywide instability and intermittent conflict that began in the early-90s, has reduced 
national output and government revenue, and increased external debt.”62 Originally a Belgian 
colony, DRC got its independence in 1960, but even then, the country was rife with instability. 
When the Belgians left, a military leader named Mobutu Sese Seko took advantage of the 
confusion to stage a takeover in 1965.63 Mobutu spent 32 years in power up until the late 1990s 
embezzling large amounts of the country’s money, including American investment and CIA 
activities in the country. It is estimated that in the decades he was in power he amassed about 
$5 billion.64 Mobutu’s IFFs are important because according to Tax Justice Network, the DRC’s 
state budget in 2007 “some 50 per cent – was allocated to servicing public debts incurred by 
corrupt lifetime dictator Mobutu Seso-Seko.”65 
 
To understand the current important political battle between President Tshisekedi and former 
President Kabila, a very brief understanding of how Kabila came to power is needed. In the late 
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1990s, Laurent Kabila staged his rebellion, successfully overthrowing the Mobutu regime. In 
January 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated, and his son Joseph Kabila was named his 
successor. Joseph Kabila was officially elected to office in 2006.66 Another election with highly 
disputed results in November 2011 reelected Kabila as president. The DRC constitution 
prohibited Kabila to run for a third time, but the DRC delayed the elections from November 
2016 to December 2018.67 The delay and subsequent irregularities of the election caused 
protests and tensions across the country. The Kabila family also has a history of laundering 
money from the country. The Kabila family in particular made a big move through an investment 
firm called Kwanza Capital to try and take over the $5 billion banking industry.68 While the Kabila 
bid was ultimately not successful, the previous president and his family still own or partially own 
more than 80 businesses and companies in DRC and abroad as well as large amounts of land and 
mining rights.69 The Kabila family was money laundering millions from misappropriations of 
public funds.70 Since Kabila and his fellow party members were benefiting from the lack of 
regulation and corruption, this previous presidential administration was disinclined to 
crackdown on IFFs.  
 
In January 2019, Félix Tshisekedi from a Kabila opposition party was elected in a contested 
election. Many thought that Kabila would arrange the vote to support his successor, but instead 
it was reported that Tshisekedi reached a behind the scenes deal between the two. A third 
opposition leader, Martin Fayulu is widely believed to be the winner in the election; however, 
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his challenge to the election failed and Tshisekedi was elected President.71 One proposal for 
strengthening government regulations has to do with making sure the democratic process and 
elections are fair and free. The election committee National Independent Electoral Commission 
(CENI) should be separate from the government’s political influence and the election openly and 
fairly carried out, which will strengthen the integrity of their institutions.72  
 
Despite the election irregularities, the alleged agreement which Kabila and Tshisekedi made 
came to fruition after the election. While Tshisekedi is from one of the oldest Kabila opposition 
parties, and has general popular support, Kabila’s party still gained a huge majority in the 
country’s parliament. Kabila’s party gaining much of parliament caused Tshisekedi to enter a 
power-sharing agreement with Kabila that severely limited Tshisekedi’s power. 73 After two 
years of this ongoing power struggle, in December 2020, President Tshisekedi was able to 
consolidate his ruling coalition away from the previous 18-year ruling Kabila.74 Moreover, 
Tshisekedi was able to declare the pact failed and oust the pro-Kabila prime minister and 
leaders of both houses of Parliament.75 President Tshisekedi being able to consolidate power 
was surprising and creates an unprecedented opportunity for Tshisekedi to deliver on the 
platform of anti-corruption and to be able to pass some of the legislation that is greatly needed 
in the country. The country has poor regulation and follow through on combating illegal finance 
activity up until now contributing to the country’s legal and political risks for IFFs.  
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President Tshisekedi is currently the new African Union head, making them a strategic partner 
for the U.S. with whom to work.76 Desire for better regulation and less capital flight is felt by the 
Congolese people just as well as the rest of the world. DRC has some active civil societies which 
support any measure that will help the country such as The Centre de Recherche sur l’Anti-
Corruption (CERC) which is a Congolese civil society organization that wants to support “active 
engagement on transparency and accountability”.77 The DRC consistently ranks as one of the 
poorest nations in the world.  Better regulation could help their financial standing. 
 
The DRC has made some positive strives towards some regulation, but they still need more 
measures put in place to fix the complex problem in the country. According to The Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) which is the standard for managing oil, gas, and mineral 
resources, DRC has already started working towards the mining standards. EITI does note 
though that revenues were not given out according to the regulatory framework.78 Vital 
Kamerhe, Tshisekedi’s former chief of staff, in 2020 was convicted of embezzlement and 
corruption, and he was sentenced to 20 years in prison. Kamerhe is the highest-level public 
official who has been found guilty of corruption.79 Another positive occurrence is a Congolese 
bank, BGFIBank DRC, is one of the first banks in sub-Saharan Africa to receive an AML 30000 
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anti-money laundering certification.80 BGFIBank DRC is a Gabon-based major banking operation 
in DRC. BGFIBank’s certification is a promising achievement for DRC and Central Africa as a 
whole. AML 30000 is an “evaluation and endorsement of a company’s risk assessment, know-
your-client processes, document retention, suspicious activity reporting, governance, IT and 
resources.”81 In December 2020, Donald Trump issued a proclamation of reinstating the DRC to 
the African Growth and Trade Act (AGOA).82 The reinstatement is a U.S. acknowledgement that 
DRC is making positive efforts to meet the requirements which include strengthening “the DRC’s 
democratic institutions, protect human rights, and combat corruption.”83 AGOA is a tool for U.S. 
economic policy that lets admitted countries have duty-free access for potentially thousands of 
products.  
 
The Congolese economy is dependent on international donations, so the international 
community has a great deal of influence over the finance of the country. This year, the Covid-19 
pandemic has caused an economic crisis worldwide, so it is estimated activity will potentially fall 
by about 2 percent, furthering Congolese dependency on international loans and aid.84 The 
economy has been slowing since 2019, because of a drop in commodity prices.85 The IMF has 
sent an additional $363.27 million disbursement to the DRC in response to the COVID-19 
pandemic.86 As the Congo economy is so dependent, they are more likely to listen to outside 
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countries. Since the election of Tshisekedi, the U.S. has had great relations with the DRC. In 
2019, the U.S. released the U.S.-DRC Privileged Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (PP4PP) 
which was installed to work with the U.S. in “a joint commitment to work together on areas of 
mutual concern.”87 The DRC has many complex issues, but by the U.S. helping the DRC to 
strengthen their regulation framework to combat IFFs, the U.S. can aid the DRC and the world at 
the same time.  
 
IV. Policy Proposal 
 
While the DRC has a multitude of problems that contribute to IFFs, there are still precise 
measures that the U.S. can do to help reach the goal of reducing IFFs. The specific goal would be 
to reduce the AML Risk in the DRC by 2030 and increase the score to a 30/100 which would 
classify the DRC as High Risk/Moderate response instead of Extremely High Risk/Very Low 
response.88 The U.S. hopes that DRC, with the rest of the world, can meet the Sustainable 
Development Goal of “by 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen 
the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime.”89 The goal of 
reducing IFFs also falls in line with the Addis Agenda which UN Member countries, including the 
DRC, have committed to reducing illicit funds. The U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) 
and State will be integral in this effort. As presented in the earlier section, joint 
recommendations have already been proposed to the previous Secretary of State and Secretary 
of the Treasury from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which this proposal will echo a 
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few of those key recommendations. The focus of this proposal, however, is slightly narrower on 
four steps that the U.S. can help the DRC government to combat IFFs.  
 
Both the Treasury and State, under their legal authority vested in these departments, have 
jurisdiction in the IFFs area.90 State is the presence overseas and partners with international 
bodies to implement programs and policies. Treasury works with financial institutions, runs 
AML/CFT programs, and manages the U.S. Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) which in turn 
manages sanctions. To implement sanctions, the president is authorized under the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA), section 204(b) 50 U.S.C. 1703(b) and under 
the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act 22 U.S.C. §2656.91 The sanctions against 
Gertler are under the Global Magnitsky sanction authority. To enact sanctions, Treasury and 
State should recommend to the National Security Council (NSC) and the President, which once 
approved, is given back to Treasury and State for language drafting and management.92 Under 
the authorization of the Treasury to manage and track illicit finance, the Treasury can move 
forward with that side of the combatting IFFs effort. However, Treasury does not have a 
permanent representative in the DRC, so State and the U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa would need to 
implement measures on the ground. The current embassy personnel have negotiating power 
with the government of DRC. Current Ambassador Mike Hammer and U.S. Embassy Kinshasa can 
use the PP4PP program currently in place between the U.S. and DRC to bring up the specific 
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issue of IFFs. One of the PP4PP’s goals is anti-corruption, so the PP4PP initiative will lend itself 
well to tackle the IFFs problem. Under the PP4PP, the U.S. and the U.S. Department of State has 
stated that they “stand firm with our partners in the DRC to counter malign behavior that 
undermines the country’s institutions and economic opportunities.”93 Putting an emphasis on 
combatting IFFs should be added to the next iteration of the U.S. Embassy Kinshasa’s Integrated 
Country Strategy.94  
 
Due to the cross-cutting nature of IFFs, it is prudent to combine Treasury action and State’s 
ability to establish relationships to create a multi-tiered approach that includes the following 
measures in a multi-step process which in conjunction will aid with combatting IFFs.  
1. The U.S. should implement further specific sanctions.  
2. The U.S. should work with the DRC to make sure previously enacted sanctions are 
enforced. 
3. The U.S. should increase the DRC anti-corruption commitments and promises to make 
sincere efforts towards AML/CFT Framework on U.S. given foreign aid and the IMF loan 
disbursements.  
4. The U.S. should encourage the DRC to create AML enforceable legal framework through 
diplomacy and experts. 
By doing these four actions simultaneously, the U.S. can help the world fight this issue through 
the DRC. The way to implement these measures are as follows.  
 
i. Implementing Further U.S. Sanctions 
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The U.S. should increase their targeted financial and travel sanctions, through Executive Order. 
Specifically, Treasury and State should recommend that the NSC and President Biden review 
whether it is appropriate to implement Global Magnitsky-style sanctions against Eurasian 
Resources Group Sarl and French national Elie-Yohann Berros, who are involved with Gertler 
and individuals in Gecamines. Gecamines, the State-run mining company, has been involved in 
the issuing many of the controversial mining rights. 95 The U.S. should additionally review 
whether the bank Afrilaand, which enabled Gertler, should also have targeted sanctions 
established.96 These are middlemen in the mining sector that are exploiting the system. More 
sanctions impacting the middlemen and other known Gertler associates will be the most 
impactful, as with these middlemen is where much of the capital flight is happening. For 
example, the Belgian gold-trading Goetz family was convicted in Belgium for dealing in illicit gold 
coming from the DRC.97 The companies they are connected to, Aldabra Ltd in Rwanda, and PGR 
Gold Trading in Dubai, should also be reviewed whether they should be sanctioned for their 
involvement.98 The U.S. should review which additional sanctions are appropriate against these 
other countries’ individuals, such as those in the refineries dealing in illicit gold mentioned 
above in neighboring countries like Rwanda and Uganda.99 The sanctions would be targeting 
more international actors that are exploiting the Congolese system, such as the examples 
above.100 Because DRC is a dollarized economy, a keyway to combat these international 
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perpetrators is through sanctions as many of the elites in DRC have significant assets globally in 
the financial system.101 The U.S. currently has around 54 sanctions against DRC individuals and 
entities, but the number is higher if you count foreign nationals who are sanctioned for their 
role in mining. The new implemented sanctions would not be overarching sanctions, but 
targeted and with a specific goal of stopping the exploitation action.102 On March 8, 2021, the 
U.S. reinstated Dan Gertler’s sanctions for his role in the Eastern Congo mining sector, by 
revoking the special license granted by the previous president.103 Reinstating sanctions was a 
good step and will support the additional sanctions needed on other mining sector IFFs. 
Additionally, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which also works with the 
U.S.’s FATF, should change the existing advisory on North Korea to include the risk of doing 
business with certain parts of the DRC.104  The Sentry’s other recommendation on sharing 
information with the private sector by publicizing risks on the Treasury and State websites 
should also be considered, specifically they suggest “The Treasury and State Departments 
should closely engage financial institutions, sharing information on the risks from corruption-
related illicit flows.”105 Most of the sanctions and negotiating can be done through the pre-
existing budgets from the Embassy and Treasury for the country. 
 
ii. Enforcing Existing Sanctions 
The U.S. should also have measures to fix the issue of individuals or companies who already 
have sanctions put on them being able to circumvent these restrictions. Ambassador Hammer 
                                                          
101 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Risch, Menendez.” 
102 Office of Foreign Assets Control, “SDN List,” OFAC, 2021, https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/. 
103 Price, “Dan Gertler.” 
104 The Sentry, “Conflict Gold.” 





and U.S. Embassy Kinshasa should pressure the DRC to remove officials from their positions who 
have sanctions for human rights abuses, such as generals and other military officers. In response 
to this, the Department of Defense (DOD) attaché in the embassy and AFRICOM should increase 
their current program of training the DRC military to be more professional.106 The U.S. will 
encourage the DRC to go against individuals who have been sanctioned by the U.S., either by 
removing them from their positions or, more preferably, prosecuting them for their crimes. The 
U.S. needs to encourage the government of DRC (GDRC) to join the Egmont Group which is an 
international organization of financial intelligence units which share information with each 
other. Joining the Egmont Group would help the DRC’s information become more accessible, 
and help the DRC tap into international intelligence to help the DRC’s intelligence unit, the 
Cellule Nationale des Renseignements Financiers (CENAREF), in process of doing their own 
investigations.107 The U.S. recently passed the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020, which was a 
part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (NDAA).108 The NDAA 
legislation also outlines higher reporting requirements for American companies and steeper 
fines for non-compliance. Treasury can use the new legislation to help penalize Americans and 
other foreign nationals in the U.S. who are involved in IFFs and those previously sanctioned in 
the DRC. In addition, the Biden Administration should appoint an experienced diplomat to fill 
the U.S. Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region.109 As mentioned many IFF issues stem from 
the mining areas, which are in the conflict-ridden Eastern DRC. By having another Ambassador 
whose sole focus is the Great Lakes region, the U.S. can help work on these problems as well as 
manage the sanctions that are implemented on individuals.  
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iii. Additional Anti-Corruption Commitments for U.S. Aid 
The next measure that the U.S. can do to help the DRC renovate its government system is to put 
additional transparency criteria on the foreign aid that is given to the DRC. State’s office of the 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and USAID can implement increased criteria on 
the aid that is given through these offices. Specifically, require annual financial reports of state-
owned companies and an independent auditing system.110 Additionally, the U.S. can influence 
the non-emergency IMF Extend Credit Facility loan decisions to also implement the additional 
financial measures that the U.S. will put on its own loans. These criteria should be implemented 
in fiscal year 2022. The IMF outstanding loans to the DRC are $537.95 million as of December 
31, 2020, so IMF funding is a good vehicle for incentivizing these measures.111 The U.S. has the 
highest number of casting votes in the IMF at 831,400, and the highest percentage of the Fund 
total at 16.51.112 The U.S. needs to encourage the IMF to continue to add measures to their 
loans as they are one of the biggest Congo lenders, but the U.S. has yet to appoint the U.S. IMF 
Executive Director. The Biden Administration should be encouraged to quickly nominate the IMF 
Executive Director so the U.S. can have greater say on these loans. Additional requirements to 
aid, diplomacy, and sanctions can all be easily implemented, as these steps are not an expense, 
just extra language on existing program criteria. 
 
iv. Implementing AML/CFT Framework 
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To implement government reforms the U.S. can lend technical assistance and ask the GDRC to 
work on the IFFs matter. Treasury should start a new program in the DRC to provide training and 
technical assistance. The Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance (OTA) should send personnel 
to help implement AML/CFT framework to meet international standards.113 Before the OTA 
program is implemented, OTA requires a written agreement called a Terms of Reference (TOR) 
document from the Congolese president and other members who will be working with the 
program.114 The OTA program will be similar to other OTA programs, three - four years in length, 
and the U.S. will also aid DRC to create an action plan after calculating the scope of the issue in 
accordance with FATF to address their deficiencies, during the period of the program, as well as 
a plan that the DRC can continue to follow even after the program is over.115 They will work with 
the DRC presidential office, finance ministry, central bank, and foreign ministry to apply the 
most recent FATF defined standards, such as independent audits, transparency in finance, 
reduction in corruption, and tax reform.116  
Furthermore, the OTA team will help implement the UNCTAD and UNODC framework for 
measuring IFFs, copying the framework used in pilot programs in Afghanistan, Nigeria, and other 
countries to help calculate a more precise scope of the IFFs in the DRC.117 The NDAA also 
outlines a similar program being implemented in Sudan, which has a reporting requirement of 
the first 3 months and then once every 6 months.118 As the DRC is reliant on foreign assistance 
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for much of its funding, the U.S. should give that program as aid to the DRC to be able to 
implement some of these programs. In DRC, public financial management (PFM) is managed by 
a combination of Ministry of Budget, Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Finance, and the Central 
Bank of Congo (BCC).119 The program will be evaluated every year for continued effectiveness 
and progress. Further projects can be considered after the first OTA project is complete such as 
aiding the CENAREF in improving their independent investigations and helping the private 
banking systems with implementing their own regulations. Before the DRC OTA program is fully 
put into effect, Ambassador Hammer can start by encouraging the GDRC to fully implement the 
mining reforms that DRC already made to the Mining Code in 2018 to prevent IFFs and to 
promote more openness in that sector.120 The U.S. should also encourage DRC to publicly 
publish financial reports for publicly owned assets and companies, so the public and private 
sector will be more effective at countering IFFs.121 The U.S. can encourage them to do so, and 
the OTA program can also work reporting requirement framework assistance into their AML/CFT 
framework plan. 
 
The DRC OTA program will cost money and the Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes 
(TFFC) will send new specialists into the DRC to aid local officials to strengthen the AML/CFT 
Framework through the OTA program. The cost will most likely come out of the OTA’s budget, 
which their FY2021 budget request was $33,000,000 from Congressional appropriations.122 The 
OTA also uses funds given from State and USAID to help supplement funding, which for the DRC 
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project would make sense because there is already such a large footprint of programs from 
State and USAID.123 Since OTA, with the supplemented budgets, has about 92 programs, then 
the average amount annually spent on one of these programs is $550,000. The DRC program 
would be about that amount for the first year with a need for additional allotments every 
additional year. The DRC OTA program should run up to three years with an optional two-year 
extension, making the total amount for the whole period $1,650,000. The OTA for the DRC’s 
AML/CFT framework program will need to ask for additional FY2022 funds from Congress. 
 
Through the main implementation bodies of State and Treasury, the U.S. can use sanctions, 
regulations, and an assistance program to help the DRC to combat its problem.  
 
V. Policy Analysis 
 
The mix of U.S. assistance, encouragement, and sanctions make up this policy, and therefore 
need to be evaluated as a whole. The question is would U.S. intervention on combatting IFFs be 
effective. We must weigh the benefits versus the drawbacks of the four steps purposed in the 
policy to evaluate whether sanctions, improved enforcement of existing sanctions, putting 
requirements on foreign assistance, and an AML/CFT implementation program are the most 
efficient ways to handle combatting IFFs.  
 
The first thing which must be assessed is the cost. The obvious cost to the DRC OTA program is 
the general estimated cost of $1,650,000 funds that are being contributed to the OTA program, 
                                                          
123 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Department of The Treasury International Affairs Technical Assistance 2019 Report To 
Congress,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2019, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/2019-OTA-Report-to-Congress.pdf. 
28 
 
and the money that would contribute to the program could be more effectively used in other 
areas. Still, the amount is relatively small compared to other programs such as the most recent 
assistance to Sudan in the NDAA, which authorized $10,000,000 for fiscal years 2021 and 
2022.124 In fact, the $550,000 in funds for one fiscal year is a smaller amount than what the 
United States announced they are providing for the rapid response Ebola team. The U.S. has 
already pledged $3.5 million to combat the Ebola problem in the DRC and Guinea.125 The U.S. 
has many aid programs in DRC of various levels of effectiveness, but the OTA programs are 
unique in that they partner directly with the financial sector. So, the DRC OTA program has 
comparatively low costs to other programs, and the benefits could be great. As previously 
mentioned, the capital flight from the gold trade alone is $3 billion, not counting the revenue 
lost to tax fraud and corruption. Since it is estimated that higher than 5 percent of DRC’s GDP is 
lost to capital flight, the OTA low-cost program could have a high benefit.126  
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Figure 2: Cost Benefit Analysis Scale of Enacting the Proposal 
 
Benefits to Implementation 
Issuing additional sanctions and having Ambassador Hammer encourage the GDRC to implement 
policy, as well as using existing programs to focus on the IFFs issue in the DRC, will help to reach 
State and Treasury goals and continue to put pressure on the DRC to work on the IFFs subject. In 
the Treasury Strategic Plan 2018-2022, Strategy 3.2C is to “Encourage international partners to 
adopt, implement, and enforce international AML/CFT standards.”127 Their measure and 
indicator of success for this point is in the number of partners that adopt the standards. The DRC 
using the OTA program to adopt these standards would be a success for Treasury. To reach the 
goal of 30/100, DRC needs to show that it is making a sincere effort to respond to its problems 
and install FATF framework. The DRC assessment is based on a variety of factors, so if DRC 
implements the U.S. aid proposal and starts following the U.S. suggestions of punishing 
sanctioned individuals, the score of 30/100 can be achieved.128 DRC needs to show that they are 
giving at least a moderate effort to try and combat IFFs.  
 
The U.S. helping previous sanctions to be enforced will create a message that those who are 
sanctioned will face real consequences. According to the Sentry, “FinCEN advisories play a 
critical role in anti-corruption and sanctions enforcement efforts.”129 With the increase in fines 
and punishments that have been enacted through the NDAA, the U.S. can make more of an 
impact on companies. Before the crime’s severity was increased, JP Morgan Chase was fined by 
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the Treasury a sum of $88.3 million for violating sanctions out of OFAC. Similar repercussions 
can disincentivize banks from doing business with the newly sanctioned individuals.130  
 
Targeted sanctions have been more effective than broad sanctions in the past. The fact that 
Gertler worked so hard to get the U.S. to grant a special license from the sanctions put upon him 
means that he was being affected by them. In 2017, when the sanctions were initially imposed, 
Gertler hired Trump’s lawyer Alan Dershowitz to get his license, so he could access his accounts. 
The reprieve has since been canceled.131 As the DRC is a dollarized economy, and the 
international members involved in IFFs use dollars extensively and are more likely to travel 
overseas, these sanctions have more impact on those individuals. Studies have suggested that 
the more a country relies on the U.S. the more effective the sanctions will be, and because many 
individuals need U.S. dollars to do business in the DRC, they have to have some level of business 
with the U.S.132 Sanctions bundled with the other aspects of the proposal are a positive thing 
because most of the research on sanctions indicates they are most effective when targeted and 
coupled with other policy measures, such as the AML program proposed. Unilateral sanctions 
are generally agreed by experts to be ineffective, but these are targeted sanctions.133  
 
AML/CFT framework has proven effective in other countries, and the fact that one Congolese 
bank has already implemented these measures is promising. Programs from OTA have already 
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been implemented and effective in other countries. The OTA program in Zambia, a neighboring 
country, has had success under the OTA program.134 The OTA program in Zambia, which has run 
from 2017 through 2021, focused on revenue administration and revenue policy. Most of the 
OTA programs run for three to four years. In that program they partnered with local auditors 
and trained them to strengthen auditing techniques and help them with legal support and risk 
analysis tools.135 This program also identified that Zambia was losing $76 million of tax revenue 
due to a treaty between Zambia and Mauritius, which resulted in the Zambian government 
ending that treaty.136 The Zambian program is one of many OTA programs implementing 
regulations overseas which have successfully accomplished their goals within three to four 
years, and while the Zambian program was not implementing AML/CFT framework, there are 
other successful OTA programs that have implemented this framework. These OTA programs 
have proven success, for example, the OTA program with the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank 
successfully developed and implemented their own AML/CFT risk assessment process to comply 
with FATF recommendations from 2017 to 2019.137 One of the criteria for doing an OTA program 
requires that the government must be committed to reform. With the Tshisekedi 
Administration, the DRC is showing that it is committed to reform and open to starting a 
program of this nature. Regulation in DRC has improved in the last 10 years; the 2015 World 
Bank Doing Business Report said that DRC is one of 10 countries which has made the biggest 
advances in their regulations.138 
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Putting conditions on aid has been effective since IMF loans are a large portion of the GDRC’s 
income. The overall international debt is estimated at 40 percent of the GDP in 2017.139 The 
Chinese recently extended debt relief to their loans that have matured in 2020. $2.4 billion has 
been loaned from China to the DRC between 2000-2018, but the IMF loans are higher.140 A 
recent study published in The American Economist suggests that when a country is in 
compliance with certain IMF conditions, the country does receive GDP growth.141 Working on 
AML/CFT framework would help revenue flow, so by IMF requiring it, DRC would be forced to 
look at their plans. Transparency International tracked the IMF corruption framework since they 
enacted it in 2018 and have said the country analysis and increased emphasis on combatting 
IFFs has been overall positive for the countries involved.142  
 
Disadvantages to Implementation 
This proposal addresses the issue of IFFs, but in a country with so many layers as DRC, there 
might be relatively little impact. The rule of law is weak in DRC, and the Eastern DRC, where 
much of the resources are, still has ongoing conflict that does not seem to be improving.143 Most 
recently, the Italian Ambassador was killed while in Eastern DRC.144 Because the DRC has so 
many outlier problems that contribute to the overall IFFs in the country, the goal of reaching the 
30/100 risk score may not be achievable. Until the DRC starts progressing on solving their 
conflicts and charging those who are culpable in human rights and other crimes, the four steps 
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to this proposal may not be enough to be effective. The policy proposal includes lots of soft 
power encouragement to the GDRC, but these are just conversations that cannot be enforced by 
the U.S.  
 
The U.S. can try to help with its policies, but ultimately the GDRC is going to have to take 
ownership of the IFFs issue. There are many prerequisites which need to happen to be able to 
effectively work on the IFFs problem, such as ending the conflict in Eastern DRC, paying and 
professionalizing their police force, renovating their tax code to receive additional tax revenue, 
and tracking fraud in the country. There are less than 10 years until 2030, which is not much 
time to try and revamp these many and long-lasting complicated sectors. The UN has had many 
failures in the DRC, specifically Eastern DRC, which shows that the DRC issues run deep, and they 
have been in DRC for a long period of time. The UN failure shows that U.S. policy may not have 
much impact, as the UN and the U.S. have been working in the DRC for a long time and have not 
had significant change.145 Corruption hinders all efforts for reforms and even if the U.S. 
implements a successful program, the OTA program could take a long time to implement and 
that could incur extra costs. The two North Korean bankers got around sanctions in the DRC by 
making relationships with local city and provincial government authorities.146  
 
Critics of sanctions say, while potentially globally shaming an individual, sanctions are limited in 
scope. Sanctions really only limits individuals from going to America and freeze their American 
bank assets.147 Sanctioned individuals are not necessarily affected if the country in which they 
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are doing their activities, such as the DRC, is not inclined to enforce. Gertler, while hurt by 
sanctions freezing his overseas assets, is still able to work relatively freely in the DRC.148 Many of 
the generals and other government officials are still in power even after the U.S. enacted 
sanctions against them. Sanctions also tend to have unintended consequences, and targeted 
sanctions have not been evaluated as extensively as unilateral sanctions.149 Some examples of 
when sanctions have had the wrong effect are when the individuals develop commercial 
interests that are not as dependent on the U.S. or the democratic freedoms and human rights 
violations got worse. If the sanction is a UN sanction, it tends to be more effective than a U.S. 
sanction, because it is more universal.150  
 
IFFs are by their very nature, illicit, so tracking exact dollar amounts and taking on these 
enterprises is a difficult task. Many companies and individuals use corporations to try and hide 
ownership or make illicit finance appear legitimate.151 Even U.S. banks sometimes have trouble 
complying with the suggested AML/CFT framework in regard to transparency of beneficial 
ownership and legal arrangements.152 The fact that even U.S. banks have issues calculating and 
tracking IFFs demonstrates that the DRC will have a hard time dealing with IFFs as well. The 
effectiveness of combatting the issue drops even lower in the DRC where transactions are 
largely informal.  
 
The OTA AML/CFT framework program may fail or be rejected. OTA tends to be very selective in 
choosing their programs, though an endorsement of an OTA program in the DRC from the 
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Secretary of State and Secretary of Treasury would help prioritize the DRC for the OTA. The OTA 
requires sufficient buy-in from the host government and assesses the impact of every project. If 
the DRC does not sign a bilateral TOR, then OTA program is not going to work. OTA at the 
quarterly point can curtail or end their project if less than satisfactory results are achieved. 
According to OTA’s report, the termination of a program happens to at least 6 percent of their 
projects.153 
 
IMF loans have increasingly been including anti-corruption framework, as have U.S. lending aid, 
but some critics believe that the IMF should not take on corruption and transparency issues.154 
Others argue that IMF needs to protect its loans from mismanagement, and IMF loans are a 
good vehicle for transparency. The real question is would IMF withhold needed monetary loans 
for corruption and transparency reasons. The reality is IMF can get promises out of countries, 
but it is still dispersing loans to them. Critics of the IMF conditions on loans say that in general 
“conditional lending arrangements lead to little or no macroeconomic improvements in the 
short run subsequent to the loan program’s end date.”155 Transparency International also 
comments that IMF needs to release a methodology for their corruption framework, because it 
has been uneven with certain countries getting a high level of mentions and others receiving no 
mention of corruption transparency in their loans. IMF needs to evenly distribute their 
corruption framework to all countries.156   
 
Some may argue that there are other solutions to the IFFs problem, but if this policy tried to 
address all the solutions, there would be no focus on IFFs. Because of the nature of IFFs and the 
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weak points that are exploited, there are many ways that other experts have proposed to tackle 
the multi-dimensional troubles of the DRC, such as focusing on the DRC tax system to 
implement the reforms needed. Tax reform, while desperately needed, is in and of itself another 
program that needs to be an initiative of the DRC. While the OTA program, when strengthening 
the DRC programs, inevitably will address some of these issues with local officials, it is not the 
focus of the OTA program proposed. Another alternative that people have suggested is 
recovering the illicit funds and returning it to the country. There are already very extensive asset 
recovery programs that could help return the revenue lost due to IFFs, but this policy focuses on 
punishing perpetrators and strengthening weaknesses, so that it is harder for individuals to 
exploit the country in the future. The Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR) is one such program 
that is a partnership between World Bank and the UN Office on Drug and Crime.157 Another 
solution that has been proposed to help DRC is to focus on making sure the elections are free 
and fair to strengthen democratic institutions and in turn help fight IFFs.158 While critics can 
argue which program is their preference, the proposal here is a more targeted approach to 
strengthening deficiencies, rather than recovery or tax reform.  
 
Overall, the pros and cons of this proposal are about even for each of the items.   
 
VI. Political Analysis 
 
The United States will benefit from strengthening their partnership with the DRC and showing 
that they are trying to help combat this global issue. The U.S. is affected by IFFs, as many of the 
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individuals using the DRC’s loose regulations are adversely affecting U.S. systems, such as the 
two North Koreans evading sanctions, as well as illicitly gained funds contributing to the 
perpetuation of the current Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) group.159 The ISCAP has 
grown; recently the Biden Administration elevated their designation on March 10, 2021 to 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and 
the State Department through Executive Order 13224 has designated ISIS-DRC as Specially 
Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs).160 It will be politically advantageous to combat funding for 
these groups, as combating terrorism is something bipartisan people can get behind.  
 
The U.S. has shown that enacting sanctions and other designations such as the foreign terrorist 
designations above are very popular politically and will continue to be popular. The new Deputy 
Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo even identified sanctions as a key U.S. national security tool 
during his confirmation hearing and expects them to be used as an option for years to come.161 
The current State is even planning on bringing back the Hillary Clinton era Office of Sanctions 
Coordination, which is a good indicator that sanctions are going to increase.162 The revival of the 
Office of Sanctions Coordination also shows that State and Treasury are the ideal partners for 
this proposal.  
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Other countries of interest to the U.S. are involved in the DRC, so combatting IFFs in the DRC 
also falls under those national security priorities as well. By adding the DRC to the North Korean 
FinCEN warning it could minimize the risk of North Koreans taking advantage of the DRC 
dollarized economy.163 The Chinese have increased their activity in the DRC, through their Belt 
and Road Initiative. For example, the Chinese battery maker Contemporary Amperex 
Technology Co Ltd (CATL) has invested in a DRC mine for $137.5 million, giving them access to 
one of the world’s largest sources of cobalt.164 The Chinese are involved in many aspects of the 
DRC, and the GDRC has been mortgaging natural resources for loans from China.165 Recently, the 
DRC joined the Belt and Road Initiative of China, and in exchange for joining, the Chinese 
cancelling of $28 million in loans.166 But China only owns a small amount of DRC debt, so DRC 
will still needs more international help. IMF loans and U.S. foreign assistance are still needed 
and used in the DRC. Since resources are one of the sources for IFFs, this is another political 
reason the U.S. should show that they are moving on the IFFs issue in the DRC by enacting the 
proposal.  
 
The U.S. is committed to aiding the DRC with their issues. The Biden Administration especially is 
committed to helping. On the initial call of the Biden Administration between President 
Tshisekedi and Vice-President Kamala Harris, the U.S. committed to working together with the 
DRC on a plethora of topics, one of which was to “promote human rights and good 
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governance.”167 The Biden Administration also wants to strengthen the partnership with 
President Tshisekedi as the current head of the African Union. President Biden and Secretary 
Blinken both have made a point to emphasize improving relations with partners overseas. 
Strengthening the DRC strategic partnership is a part of that, as Secretary Blinken’s most recent 
speech to NATO says, “First, we must recommit to our alliances – and to the shared values that 
sustain them.” He also emphasized a recent poll from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs that 
“nine in ten Americans believe that maintaining our alliances is the most effective way to 
achieve our foreign policy goals.”168 Blinken’s statement is a good indicator of support from the 
current administration and the public for the program proposed. In fact, the steps advocated in 
this proposal are similar to those that received bipartisan support in the original congressional 
letter to the previous Secretary of State and Secretary of Treasury.169 The aims of the proposal 
should not have many political opponents, as indicated by previous support.  
 
Due to the international nature of the IFFs issue, there are a lot of stakeholders involved in illicit 
financial flows in the DRC, the FATF for one. The FATF would most likely support the U.S. 
program in the DRC, as it further helps the FATF mission. Treasury is the liaison for FATF in the 
U.S. The IMF has no reason to go against a United States request for more requirements on their 
loans, because putting increased measures on loans is something that the IMF is trending 
toward. They have already put increased anti-corruption restrictions on Covid-19 relief funding, 
thus adding more to help the country be more self-sufficient would be aligned with their current 
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policies.170 USAID has always been committed to good governance and transparency, through 
their Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance office, so enacting more regulation on loans 
and the OTA programs could get supported.171 Yet, USAID may get frustrated at the additional 
potential barrier to getting aid to those who need it, like the local population of DRC that have 
many humanitarian needs.  
 
The DRC by taking the action outlined in the proposal would be working towards the 
international commitments it has made such as the UN Convention against Corruption and the 
DRC’s commitment to GABAC within the FATF.172 The UN Convention against Corruption is a 
legally binding universal anti-corruption treaty that the DRC ratified in 2010.173 The DRC has 
indicated they would like the support in a recent UN Briefing on the Great Lakes Region, with 
the Congolese delegate stating “international support is also needed to stem the illicit 
exploitation of resources in the region, which is a major source of funding for the armed 
groups.”174 The main UN body that would be a key stakeholder is the UNCTAD, as they are the 
one that releases the reports about IFFs. The UNCTAD will be tentatively supportive of any effort 
to combat IFFs, but according to their report, the UN should be handling the IFFs problem and 
want a more universal approach. The UNCTAD would probably ask that instead of the U.S. 
program the UN should handle it.175 However, the U.S. has a better relationship with the current 
DRC government. While the UN’s largest mission is in the DRC, they are not very popular with 
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the DRC and there have been anti-UN protests in the Eastern-DRC. In Beni, around 60 people 
were arrested during anti-UN protests, because the DRC citizens are upset with their inability to 
quell the violence there.176  
 
President Tshisekedi has strong support from the Congolese public, which is probably what is 
accounting for his recent consolidation power moves. There is 69 percent support for the 
President and democracy, but many are still concerned by the corruption in the country and the 
economy.177 The DRC local sector is expecting Tshisekedi to live up to his promises, 81 percent 
of Congolese believe that corruption has a negative impact on their lives.178 Working with the 
U.S. to put into place protections to prevent capital flight and regulation reform will be 
favorable to the Congolese.179 If President Tshisekedi follows U.S. recommendations in this 
proposal, it will further prove that he is committed to punishing those who are exploiting the 
Congolese. In general, the local Congolese would appreciate further progress on combatting 
IFFs. The Congolese civil society groups have been particularly calling for the need to reform for 
corruption and regulation, which is why they should also be given buy-in to the OTA program.180 
 
A Few Political Barriers 
While Tshisekedi is continuing to consolidate power, there are many layers to the Congolese 
government. The Congolese congressional institution has many members and because of the 
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low regulations and corruption, the U.S. could be less effective at enacting the OTA program, 
even with the Tshisekedi Administration’s support.181 The further out from Kinshasa, the weaker 
the President’s power gets, and in the East, where the mining and violence issues are, the 
President and his party’s power are relatively weak. The lack of power in the Eastern DRC makes 
it difficult for any reform that the OTA could enact to reach that area. The Congolese 
government officials may also protest against further criteria to loans and aid, even though 
ultimately these are better for the long-term development of the country. Another section of 
government that is needed is the Congolese parliament, which is necessary to hold accountable 
those in the Congolese military under U.S. sanctions. As of right now, the parliament needs to 
empower the courts to be independent, as currently it is underfunded and influenced by 
parliamentary politics.182 While these are potential barriers to the OTA program, with Tshisekedi 
consolidating power in parliament, right now is an ideal time politically to implement a program 
to have some impact on IFFs.  
 
Local political actors profit from the current system, so they do not want to have any large-scale 
change, especially when it comes to the increased regulation and transparency that comes with 
AML/CFT framework. The lack of motivation from those who profit from the system makes it 
difficult to enact widespread change with narrow U.S. policy tools and training. The Countering 
Corruption Through U.S. Foreign Assistance research report, from the Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) brought up the point that “for some time, U.S. funders have explicitly invoked the 
need to account for political will when designing and supporting anti-corruption programs.”183 
According to their findings, technical capacity challenges are not necessarily why the programs 
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fail, but more that those who benefit have no incentive to change. The CRS report states that 
this is “particularly true with regard to systemically corrupt countries in which corrupt behavior 
is not an aberration but the entrenched norm across government institutions and the private 
sector.”184 All of these concerns could be applied to an OTA program in the DRC, due to the 
systematic corruption. The CRS report findings apply to many foreign aid programs, but that has 
never stopped the U.S. from being successful at providing foreign resources. Furthermore, if the 
U.S. withholds foreign aid because of these concerns, the U.S. would lose some of its global 
influence, allowing other countries to fill the void.185  
 
Sanctions make splashy headlines and can be a way to make a point towards a particular issue 
or individual, but do not always work the way that the U.S. would like them too. Sometimes 
sanctions are no more than an admonishment politically, but effectively do not deter those 
individuals. Additional sanctions could also have consequences with individual’s political 
connections in the GDRC. Those individuals who are sanctioned, but have political connections, 
could jeopardize the other aspects of this proposal. Previous sanctions put on individuals for 
actions in the DRC occurred because of high level connections in the GDRC. The UN Security 
Council, as well as the United States, has had various arms embargos and sanctions on the DRC 
since 2003, and the problems in the DRC have persisted to this day.186 There is also the risk that 
the U.S. could be considered involving themselves in another country’s business. Being accused 
of overstepping our jurisdiction can happen when the U.S. does any overseas action, but the 
positive thing is that the OTA program specifically gets country buy-in for the DRC. There is 
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always the risk of U.S. aid exacerbating corruption as well, which could be a risk for the OTA 
program, as it is assistance.187 These local political connections are an additional reason as to 
why this proposal calls for increased anti-corruption regulation on foreign aid in conjunction 
with the assistance proposed. 
 
IFFs are a problem that is not inherently political, in that, most people can agree that these 
actions are illegal and that the flight of capital hurts the countries in which it is occurring. 
However, there is still a more basic opposition that those, such as former President Trump, who 
opposed foreign aid in general. The opposition to foreign aid was brought up again during the 
debate over the December 2020 Covid-19 relief and omnibus spending bill, when certain 
Republicans asked to reevaluate U.S. spending on foreign aid programs, especially while the U.S. 
is in its own crisis.188 It is in the U.S.’s self-interest to help foreign countries with aid, which is 
especially the current stance of the Biden Administration. Furthermore, the OTA program is 
relatively cheap compared to the overall budget of foreign assistance or even the $2.3 trillion 
relief package.189 Moreover, three parts of this proposal are implementing and increased 
enforcement of sanctions, as well as increased criteria for aid. These measures are showing that 
State and Treasury are trying to make sure the DRC is being held accountable for the foreign aid 
that is given from U.S. taxpayers. Combatting IFFs in the DRC, helps the U.S. and the worldwide 
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While this may not solve all the country’s problems, the solution proposed in this paper should 
be enacted. Combatting illicit financial flows is a problem that has serious consequences for the 
world and sub-Saharan Africa. The IFFs problem is shared between low-, middle-, and high-
income countries, so any policy that can help mitigate IFFs is worth implementing.190 Focusing 
on the DRC, the U.S. can help with their programs and, with President Tshisekedi consolidating 
power, the DRC is in a good position to partner with the U.S. on strengthening their regulations. 
The U.S. can further its commitment to fighting IFFs, as well as publicize the work that State and 
Treasury are doing in the combatting IFFs area. In the long run, this policy will help the DRC to 
improve its own regulations, while still punishing the individuals who try to circumvent the law. 
The policy pros and cons are about equal but has very few political downsides and falls in line 
with current U.S. policy tools. It is implementable through existing programs, such as the U.S. 
sanction program, the PP4PP program between DRC and the U.S., and IMF loans.  
 
The strongest pro of this policy is the OTA program to be implemented in the DRC. OTA 
programs have proven track records with the programs they have enacted. The OTA program is 
an excellent way to aid the local officials in owning their own regulations and has proven past 
projects.191 The DRC OTA program has a relatively low cost compared to other programs of this 
nature.192 The sanctions, while there are downsides, will help to keep individuals accountable 
who think they are above the law. In the least, it sends the message that the U.S. does not just 
ignore those who would try to exploit the U.S. and the world economy. The U.S. government 
needs to work with the DRC to address those who are bypassing U.S. sanctions. There are 
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several high-profile cases that need to be addressed, such as the North Koreans, and the 
proposal at least gives a starting place to working through those issues.193 At least highlighting 
the issue of IFFs with the U.S. and DRC will help the two countries cooperate more moving to 
forward. Strengthening anti-corruption and AML/CFT promises on foreign aid and loans helps 
make sure that the U.S. taxpayers’ money is being managed correctly, and that the country is 
benefiting from the aid, not wrongful individuals.194  
 
Though there are many systematic issues in the DRC that cannot necessarily be addressed in one 
program or solution, the solution laid out in this proposal is one way to start mitigating the 
specific problem of IFFs. The DRC has internal historical issues and an ongoing conflict in the 
East, that the DRC itself is going to have to solve and there is only so much that the U.S. can 
do.195 However, the U.S. continuing to help the DRC is a show of support, especially during a 
time when other countries are using foreign aid as leverage. The other important point in this 
proposal is the U.S. needs to move on appointing the positions of IMF director and U.S. Special 
Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, so that we prove the U.S. cares about these areas.  
 
All measures proposed in the solution are well under the purview of the Treasury and State 
Department and build off existing initiatives. This solution ties into Goal 3, Objective 3.2 Anti-
Money Laundering and Combatting Financing of Terrorism Framework of the Treasury 
Department Strategic plan to “Identify and reduce vulnerabilities in the U.S. and international 
financial system to prevent abuse by illicit actors.”196 State and the Biden-Harris Administration 
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have additionally committed to working with the African Union, which the president of DRC is 
currently the African Union head. Working with the DRC to combat their IFFs is a further step to 
partner in “solidarity, support, and mutual respect.”197 Enacting this proposal would be an 
excellent affirmation to the world that the U.S. is continuing to fight global issues, and just as 
the president said, “America is back, diplomacy is back.”198 
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